

Message Text

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ACTION EUR-25

INFO OCT-01 IO-14 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10

L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20

USIA-15 ACDA-19 NEA-10 TRSE-00 SAJ-01 OIC-04 AEC-11

OMB-01 DRC-01 /164 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2710

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

USCINCEUR

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T USNATO 5522

E.O. 11652: GDS, 12-31-81

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: UK REACTIONS TO U.S. POSITION ON STABILIZING MEASURES

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

SUMMARY: AS REPORTED SEPTEL, UK REP AT NOVEMBER 15 SPC MEETING MADE SEVERAL PRELIMINARY COMMENTS ON RECENT U.S. MEMORANDUM AND ANNEX ON STABILIZING MEASURES. SPC WILL INTENSIFY WORK NEXT WEEK ON STABILIZING MEASURES. ACTION REQUESTED: IN PREPARATION FOR THOS DISCUSSIONS, REQUEST GUIDANCE ONPOINTS MADE IN PARA 2 OF UK STATEMENT. END SUMMARY.

BEGIN TEXT OF UK PAPER:

SECRET

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1. OUR GENERAL BELIEF IS THAT THE MAIN ALLIED AIM IN CONSTRAINTS SHOULD BE TO RESTRICT THE ENTRY INTO THE REDUCTIONS AREA OF SOVIET FORCES, SINCE THESE CONSTITUTE THE MAIN THREAT. RECIPROCAL RESTRICTIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF US FORCES WILL

OBTAINING BE UNAVOIDABLE. BUT WE SEE LITTLE ADVANTAGE IN SPECIFIC RESTRICTIONS ON NON-SOVIET WARSAW PACT FORCES, GIVEN THE NEED FOR RESTRICTIONS ON NON-US ALLIED FORCES IN EXCHANGE.

2. WE ARE PREPARING A DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSALS IN THE PAPER ENTITLED "ANNEX: STABILISING MEASURES", BUT AT FIRST SIGHT THE FOLLOWING ARE THE POINTS IN IT THAT COULD CAUSE DIFFICULTY:

(A) THE PAPER FAILS TO TAKE ACCOUNT (UNLIKE THE WORKING GROUP PAPER AC-276(D)72/49) OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT US "REFORGER" AND OTHER UNITS MIGHT HAVE TO ENTER THE REDUCTION AREA AT VERY SHORT NOTICE IN A TIME OF TENSION.

(B) SOME OF THE PROVISIONS SEEM UNDULY DETAILED, FOR EXAMPLE THE PROPOSAL IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF SECTION 1 OF THE ANNEX THAT THE RUSSIANS AND AMERICANS WOULD INFORM ONE ANOTHER OF "INCREASE OF MORE THAN 10 (SIC) IN AN ALREADY SCHEDULED MONTHLY TOTAL OF ENTERING PERSONNEL".

(C) WE, AND WE IMAGINE THE FRG ALSO, WOULD FIND IT HARD TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL THAT EXERCISES SHOULD NOT TAKE PLACE WITHIN 50 KM OF THE FRG/GDR BORDER.

(D) WE CONTINUE TO DISLIKE THE IDEA OF LIMITING OR GIVING ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS OF FORCES WITHIN THE REDUCTIONS AREA, PARTICULARLY OF COURSE IF THIS IS TO APPLY TO BRITISH FORCES. AS WE HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, SHAPE ALSO PREFERS COLLATORAL MEASURES TO APPLY ONLY TO FORCE MOVEMENTS INTO THE REDUCTIONS AREA, LEAVING THE MAXIMUM FREEDOM FOR FORCE MOVEMENTS WITHIN IT. WE ARE PREPARED TO AGREE TO ADVANCE NOTIFICATION IN THE CSCE CONTEXT FOR THE VERY REASONS GIVEN IN THE US PAPER, NAMELY THAT THE COMMITMENT WILL BE VOLUNTARY, AND PROBABLY IN GENERAL TERMS.

(E) THE US PAPER DOES NOT EXPLAIN HOW ITS RATHER COMPLICATED SECRET

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PROVISIONS WOULD BE ADMINISTERED IN PRACTICE. THE PREPARATION OF SUCH DETAILED SCHEDULES, CALLING IN SOME CASES FOR RAPID CHANGES AT SHORT NOTICE, WOULD SEEM TO REQUIRE A LARGE BUREAUCRACY.

(F) THERE SEEMS TO BE NO PROVISION FOR VERIFICATION. THIS IS OF COURSE A SEPARATE, BUT NEVERTHELESS CLOSELY RELATED SUBJECT.

3. SOME OF OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES HAVE ADVANCED DOMESTIC AND OTHER POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS TO JUSTIFY THE NEED FOR SOME MULTI-LATERALISATION OF THE FIRST STAGE OF MBFR. IT WAS WITH THIS IN MIND THAT WE PUT FORWARD OUR OWN PROPOSAL, WHICH WAS INTENDED

TO GIVE OUR EUROPEAN ALLIES A MULTILATERAL STAKE IN WHAT WOULD OTHERWISE BE A BILATERAL FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ARRANGEMENT, WITH THE MINIMUM RESTRICTIONS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF EUROPEAN ARMED FORCES. WE HAVE NOTED THE US OBJECTIONS TO OUR PROPOSAL AND WE RESPECT THE REASONING BEHIND THEM. WE ARE OF COURSE AS KEEN AS THE US TO GIVE THE RUSSIANS NO CHANCE TO INTERFERE WITH NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, AND PARAGRAPH 1 OF OUR DRAFT DECLARATION WAS CAREFULLY WORDED WITH THIS TRAP IN MIND. WE WUOULD NOT WISH TO PURSUE THE IDEA OF SUCH A DECLARATION IF OUR ALLIES BELIEVE IT TO BE DISADVANTAGEOUS. BUT WE CONTINUE TO THINK THAT A DEVICE OF THIS KIND MIGHT BE SUFFICIENT TO MEET THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS WHICH HAVE BEEN ADVANCED. WE ARE OF COURSE WILLING TO CONTEMPLATE ANY CHANGES EITHER IN DRAFING OR INDEED IN SUBSTANCE THAT OUR ALLIES MIGHT PROPOSE.

4. IN SHORT OUR PREFERENCE REMAINS TO HAVE DETAILED CONSTRAINTS LIMITED TO US AND SOVIET FORCES ONLY: AND FOR THE EUROPEAN POLITICAL REQUIREMENT TO BE TAKEN CARE OF BY A DECLARATORY MEASURE OF BROAD APPLICATION. FOR THE PURPOSES OF TABLING THE "FRAMEWORK PROPOSAL" NEXT WEEK WE WOULD BE SATISFIED WITH GENERAL LANGUAGE.

END TEXT. MCAULIFFE

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